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There is, in the Colorado Constitution, no article or provision
which specifically provides for cross examination in hearings be-
fore Colorado administrative agencies. However, this right may
be inferred from the due process clause of the Constitution,' and
it is a right which is zealously guarded by the courts with regard
to both judicial proceedings and proceedings before administra-
tive agencies.
Colorado is among those states which allow the administra-
tive agencies to use their own prerogative in adoption of the com-
mon law rules of procedure. There is very little statutory or case
law upon the subject of cross examination and rebuttal before
administrative agencies in Colorado. However, from what the au-
thor was able to ascertain from the reported cases on the subject,
it appears that the agencies and the courts will protect this funda-
mental right.
Statutory Recognition of Right
In the establishment of the Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission in Colorado, the legislature provided for cross examination
in hearings before the Commission. In the section entitled Rules
of Evidence-Procedure 2 it is provided that:
Such commission or persons by it duly designated,
shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure other than herein or by the rules of the com-
mission provided, but may make such investigations in
such manner as in its judgment are best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of this article.
This section shows the power of the Commission to set its own
rules of procedure. However, in Hearings-Notice-Evidence-
Order,3 it is provided that:
Either party shall have the right to be present at
any hearing [and] . . . shall have the right of cross ex-
amination .... All ex parte testimony shall be reduced to
writing and either party shall have opportunity to rebut
the same in final hearing.
Statutory authority establishing the right of cross examina-
tion and rebuttal in hearings before the Public Utilities Commis-
sion is set out in the article which sets up the Commission.4 It is
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
I Colorado Constitution, Art. II, sec. 25.
1935 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, sec. 24.
1 Op cit., sec. 37.




At the time fixed at any hearing before the commis-
sion, any commissioner or examiner, or at the time to
which the same may have been continued, the applicant,
petitioner, complainant, the person, firm or corporation
complained of, such persons, firms, or corporations as the
commission may allow to intervene and such persons,
firms, or corporations as may be interested in or affected
by any order that may be made by the commission in such
proceedings shall be entitled to be heard, examine and
cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence. . . .All
persons shall be entitled to be heard in person or by
attorney.
Thus it may be seen that there exists statutory right to cross
examination and rebuttal in hearings before two of the largest
and most important commissions in the state.
Judicial Protection of Right in Colorado
The Colorado Supreme Court has, in the cases before it on
the subject, protected this right. In Denver & S. L. R. Co. v. Chi-
cago B. & Q. R. Co.,5 a rate making case before the Public Utilities
Commission, the court stated:
The commission is an administrative body, and where
it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity it is not limited by the
strict rules as to the admissibility of evidence which pre-
vail in suits between private parties." "But the more lib-
eral the practice in admitting testimony, the more im-
perative the delegation to preserve the rules of evidence
by which rights are asserted and defended." All parties
must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be
considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-exam-
ine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence
in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a party'
maintain its rights or assert its defenses.
In Snell v. Public Utilities Commission,7 another case before
the Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, the court protected
the right of presenting evidence in rebuttal. The plaintiff carrier
applied to the commission for a permit to operate certain sight-
seeing busses. A hearing was held and intervenors appeared in
protest to the issuance of the permit. The permit was granted
with no limitation as to the number of vehicles to be used. A
petition for a rehearing was filed, and in oral arguments on the
petition it was denied, but at the same time and in the same order
denying the petition for rehearing, the commission purported to
amend and modify the previous order. The court held that the
5 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74.
0 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Ry Co., 227
U. S. 88.
T 108 Colo. 162, 114 P. 2d 563.
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orders of the commission must be just and reasonable and in ac-
cordance with the evidence. If the modified order had been allowed
to stand, it would have in effect denied the petitioners the right
to cross examine the evidence from which the commission modified
its original order or to present evidence in rebuttal to it. The
carrier would have been denied due process as a consequence. In
a round-about way the court upheld these rights of the petitioner.
The court found that such action was unjust and unreasonable.
In a proceeding wherein an unusual result was reached by
the commission, the state was held to have been denied the oppor-
tunity to rebut a change of mind by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission in the Allen case.8 In a personal injury action before
the commission, a hearing was held and an award made. In seven
hearings on a petition for review which extended over a period
of four years, the commission consistently held that the petition-
er's physical condition had not changed and the original award
stood as ordered. Then in another hearing the commission entered
another award stating: "on prior reviews it improperly weighed
the evidence herein, and its previous order should be set aside."
Upon this change of mind additional compensation was awarded.
The Supreme Court of Colorado on a review of the case held that:
[T]o enter the award above set out upon the simple
statement that the evidence had been improperly weighed,
and to do so without additional hearings or evidence, and
this upon the heels of consistent contrary findings estab-
lishes with crystal clearness that the prohibited change
of mind occurred without stated reasons.
To allow the second award to rest upon a mere change of mind
would have deprived the state of the opportunity to rebut the
findings or cross examine the opposing evidence that might have
been presented in a proper hearing.
Although the reported law in Colorado is very meager and
inadequate for a complete analysis of the subject, it is felt that
the courts and administrative agencies of Colorado will follow the
trend of the federal and state agencies in other jurisdictions and
continue to protect the right of cross examination and rebuttal in
proceedings before them. For an analysis of the situation in the
various states, see an article in the Minnesota Law Review, 9 and
also one in the Harvard Law Review. 10
In a case before the Federal Communications Commission 11
which involved the issuance of a license to a broadcasting station
in competition with one already existing, the question of the ad-
missibility of hearsay testimony was involved. The hearsay evi-
dence admitted consisted of the testimony of the applicant as to
'Allen v. Gadbois, 100 Colo. 141, 66 P. 2d 331.
'Hoyt, Some Practical Problems Met in the Trial of Cases Before Adminis-
lIrative Tribunals, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1941).
"Ross, Rules of Evidence Before Commissions, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 (1922-
23).
"Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 68.
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his talks with a large number of people who told him that another
station would be very beneficial and that they would support it
financially. The court held that while the commission was not
limited to the strict rules of evidence, the admission of the hearsay
testimony in question was improper because it deprived the oppos-
ing party of the right to cross examine those persons whose com-
posite views the applicant was reflecting into the record.
With regard to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under
the rules of commissions which do not follow statutory or common
law rules of evidence and procedure, it would seem that if the par-
ties are given the opportunity to cross examine and to present
evidence in rebuttal, the requirements of a fair trial have been
satisfied.
12
What Constitutes Denial of Right?
The right to cross examine an opposing witness is a substan-
tial part of the guaranty of a fair trial. The general theory of
what constitutes an infringement of one's rights is clear. The
agency is not permitted to accept as evidence anything which is
devoid of evidential value, and the party concerned must be given
a fair opportunity to demonstrate the unreliability of the prof-
fered proof. The general test is well phrased in the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946 1? (in case of certain proceedings
before federal agencies), where recognition is given to the right
"to conduct such cross examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts."
If a letter, affidavit, or report is admitted as a substitute for
the oral testimony of an individual witness as to what he has seen
or believes, the other party must be given the opportunity to cross
examine the author.
14
Similarly where the only means of attacking the accuracy of
the proffered testimony is by cross examination of the author, that
opportunity must be offered.15 Again where the credibility of the
author is in issue, the opportunity of cross examination must be
afforded.
Where the testimony relates to specific factual disputes at
issue in a particular case, cross examination is more generally in-
sisted upon than in cases where the testimony relates to matters
of general information. Where an agency desires to rely on re-
ports filed by a large number of disinterested parties, gathered in
the course of a general investigation; the rights intended to be
protected by cross examination can ordinarily be safeguarded so
long as the affected party is given full opportunity to rebut the
prima facie showing made by the reports. Impracticability of call-
12 Case Comment, Crimes-Improper Conduct of Prosecuting Attorneys. 24
Mich. L. Rev. 834 (1925-26).
"Sec. 7 (c).
14 Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., 275 Ill. 514, 114 N. E. 275
(1916).




ing a large number of witnesses makes it unwise to insist upon a
literal application of the general right of cross examination. In
cases where the agency's function is legislative or executive rather
than judicial, of course the right of cross examination does not
exist.
The Model Act provides that "every party shall have the right
of cross examination of witnesses who testify." The Wisconsin
act says that "every person shall be afforded adequate opportunity
to rebut or offer countervailing evidence." Since the act states
that the agencies "shall not be bound by the common law or statu-
tory rules of evidence," it would appear that agencies could allow
written evidence to be introduced without cross examination of
the author. In Missouri, the Bar Bill authorizes the cross examina-
tion of the author of an affidavit, but does not guarantee it.
In North Dakota, the statute provides for the same oppor-
tunity to cross examine witnesses "as is permitted to parties in an
action in the district court." This seeming assurance of an oppor-
tunity for cross examination of authors of written evidence is
weakened by the power given to the agency to waive the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence.
In California the problem has been carefully considered. As
it now stands, any party proposing to introduce an affidavit in
evidence shall so notify the opposing party, who may demand cross
examination of the affiant. If not demanded within a specified time,
the right of cross examination is waived. Even if the affidavit is
not produced for cross examination after request is made, it may
still be introduced in evidence, but "shall be given only the same
effect as other hearsay testimony." 16
The conventional objection to hearsay is that it cannot be
subjected to cross examination, but that mode of testing evidence
generally serves only to reveal the imperfections without exposing
the falsehoods of testimony given on direct examination, therefore
there is a greater tendency on the part of administrative agencies
to allow such evidence to come in than is allowed in the courts. 17
Formal hearings before the Federal Communications Com-
mission are governed by the rules of evidence which govern civil
proceedings in the courts of the United States, but the commission
retains the right to relax such rules if, in its discretion, justice
will thereby be served. In the administration of radio regulations,
this rule seems proper since the trier of facts is expert in decid-
ing the probative force of the evidence presented, and it is there-
fore capable of exercising a discrimination which the normal jury
could not be expected to possess.
1 8
Evidence Not Contained in Official Record
The Supreme Court of the United States and the state courts
are virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the practice by
16 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 545.
"Heady, Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States (1952).
SNote, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1333 (1936).
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not contained in the official record to which all parties have access.
The Supreme Court of the United States has taken a firm position
on this question beginning with the earlier cases coming to it from
the Interstate Commerce Commission. In S. C. C. v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co.,19 wherein it was sought to sustain an order of
the Commission on the basis of information gathered outside of
the hearing, the court said:
Manifestly, there is no hearing when the party does
not know what evidence is offered or considered and is
not given an opportunity to test, explain or refute it....
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence sub-
mitted or considered and must be given an opportunity
to cross examine witnesses and to offer evidence in ex-
planation or rebuttal. In no [other] way can a party
maintain its rights or make its defenses.
This language was approved by the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in Denver and S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 20 Other
state courts have consistently taken the same position. The Su-
preme Court of Illinois, in a railroad case,21 said:
The commissioners cannot act on their own informa-
tion. Their findings must be on evidence presented in
the case, with an opportunity to all parties to know of the
evidence to be submitted or considered, to cross examine
witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has permitted the commission-
ers to allow their examiners to make an ex parte investigation after
a hearing on a Workmen's Compensation case and thus obtain
information which the commissioners refused to allow the peti-
tioners to see.2 2 The court held that the validity of the commis-
sioners' award against the petitioner was not affected by this prac-
tice so long as there was in the official record competent evidence
in support of the award. The court stated that "the reports of
such special examiners are not themselves evidence, but are merely
in the nature of confidential information from which the commis-
sion may secure legal and competent evidence." It seems that the
court was somewhat confused in this case as to what evidence was.
In an earlier Illinois case, a contrary result was reached when
the commission frankly stated that it was unable to determine
which way the preponderance of evidence lay and sent out its
investigators to obtain ex parte affidavits from additional wit-
nesses. The Supreme Court reversed the resulting award, stating
that the parties had the right :23
19 227 U. S. 88 (1913).
1064 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918). See also Comp. L., 1921, ch. 79, sec. 4346.
"Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, N. E.
831, 837 (1921).
"Simpkins v. State Banking Dept., 45 Ariz. 186, 42 P. 2d 47.
" Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., op. cit.
Dec., 1952 DICTA
Dec., 1952
* , .not only to present such evidence as they may
desire, but also to be present at the taking and hearing
of evidence by the opposing party so that each may have
opportunity for the cross examination of the other's wit-
nesses.
The courts approve of the use of ex parte evidence and expect
investigations as long as the rights of cross examination and re-
buttal are allowed. 24 In the Lindsey case, the court held that such
reports as those of the commission's own engineers "are in the
nature of evidence and are, like any other evidence, subject to
analysis and impeachment, and if an application to examine the
report or the authors had been refused, it would be reversible
error."
The remedy of the aggrieved party when agencies do take
ex parte testimony is rather illusory. It is generally held that
members of an administrative body cannot be called to the wit-
ness stand and be cross examined as to their processes in deciding
the case,25 so that the opportunity of the aggrieved party to bring
a suspected violation to the attention of a reviewing court, is really
very meager.
An Appraisal of the Right of Cross Examination
The common law considers the examination of an adverse wit-
ness so essential to the elucidation of truth that it does not permit
offered testimony to be considered as evidence until opportunity
has been h-ad' -For cross exa-mination. Consequently the courts regard
the right to cross examine at administrative hearings one to be
zealously guarded.
26
In Farmers Elevator Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 27 where
the Public Utilities Commission ordered the railroad to make cer-
tain connections and where part of the evidence was obtained by
ex parte investigations, the court said:
[A] llowing the testimony to be heard by the com-
mission or one of its members without any opportunity
to cross examine the witnesses presenting it, amounts to
a practical denial of the vital part of the hearing required
by this statute. The words 'public hearing' before any
tribunal or body, by the accepted definition of lexicogra-
phers and courts, mean the right to appear and give evi-
dence, and also the right to hear and examine witnesses
whose testimony is presented by opposing parties.
An order of this nature must be based upon the evidence pre-
sented in the public hearing, with a full opportunity to cross ex-
24 Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 191 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908);
Lucas v. Walters Milling Co., 116 Pa. Super 171, 176 A. 78 (1935)
Lindsey v. Public Utilities Commissioners, 144 N. E. 729, 111 Ohio St. 6
(1924).
1Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 18 (1936).
21Note, 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 878, 884 (1932).
27 266 Il. 567, 107 N. E. 841, 843 (1915).
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amine the witnesses and to present, if desired, evidence in rebuttal
and may not be founded upon ex parte examination. "The funda-
mental right to a fair hearing is determined from the character
of the proceedings." 28 It is denied in such cases as permit unsworn
testimony, deny cross examination, or promulgate orders on the
basis of facts not received in evidence.
Experience in the conduct of all types of procedure indicates
the value of cross examination as an aid in separating the gold
from the dross of testimony. The adverse party always has a more
active interest in narrowing the facts than does the presiding
tribunal, and is usually armed with some information not known
to the tribunal as an aid in cross examination. To deny this right
is to deny fair hearing and to impede rather than assist the agen-
cies in determining facts.
If, in any hearing, rules of evidence are disregarded, they are
not necessarily violated. Lawyers usually aid commissions with-
out raising questions of admissibility of evidence and aid tribunals
in correctly appraising any kind of evidence received. While cross
examination is used for particular purposes, nevertheless it ma-
terially aids in the ascertainment of the truth because it brings
out the remaining and qualifying circumstances of testimony given
on direct examination. "Confrontation and the right to cross ex-
amine, explain or refute are necessary." 29
The Colorado courts have in the past, and should continue in
the future to protect the essential rights of cross examination and
rebuttal before administrative agencies in order that all the ele-
ments of a fair proceeding may be maintained.
COMPARATIVE PROCEDURAL PRACTICES OF
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
LEONARD T. HOWARD *
of the Nevada Bar
On the following pages are charts that indicate the number
and variety of agencies through which the State of Colorado oper-
ates its state government. These charts are not intended to be
nor are they a compilation of all state agencies but are rather a
study of those agencies that deal directly with the people (external
in nature). The state operates many other agencies whose duties
are purely of an internal nature and whose only concern is carry-
ing on the functions of government as such. These latter agencies
are not herein considered.
Due to the complexity of our state government, it is impera-
tive that many of its necessary functions be delegated to agencies
Is The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound By the Rules
of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. 63'0, 633 (1934).
2' Gauthier v. Penobscot Chemical Fiber Co., 113 A. 28 (1921).
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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